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legislature did not expressly include these acts.81 Because this question has
arisen in several cases in recent years, it is unlikely that the legislature did
not consider this question. Perhaps the legislature should amend the new
Code to state explicitly whether or not such acts were intended to be included. In the meantime, the supreme court should adhere to its traditional policy of strict construction of criminal statutes.
HOLLY D. McCoy

THE NEW ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
MISSOURI: INCREASED PROTECTION FOR THE
CLIENT OR ADDED OBSTACLES TO DISCOVERY?
State ex rel. Great American Insurance Co. v. Smithl
On December 18, 1978, the Missouri Supreme Court rendered its decision in the case of State ex rel. Great American Insurance Co. v. Smith,
and thereby established precedent protecting an extensive attorney-dient
privilege in Missouri. The case arose out of an incident on Christmas
Eve in 1973, when a restaurant and nightclub owned by Cannova Enterprises, Inc., was destroyed by fire. Proof of loss was furnished to the insurance companies which had issued policies covering Cannova's restaurant business, but the insurance claims were denied on the ground that the
loss was of incendiary origin. Cannova and Mid-Continent National Bank
(the loss payee in the insurance policies) then filed suit in three counts
did in Moore. In State v. Light, 577 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979), the defendant had been convicted of manslaughter under a theory of misdemeanormanslaughter. The defendant and the deceased had been attempting to steal
property valued at less than $50, a misdemeanor, when the deceased was electrocuted by an electrical wire. The appellate court reversed the conviction, basing
its decision on the approach taken by other jurisdictions to the question of felonymurder. One of the two main factors it considered decisive in those jurisdictions
was that the "death was caused by an outside agency, human or natural, which
had the effect, calculated or accidental, of thwarting rather than furthering the
commission of the underlying felony." Id. at 139.
81. RSMo § 565.003 (1978) defines first degree murder as follows:
Any person who unlawfully kills another human being without a premeditated intent to cause the death of a particular individual is guilty of
the offense of first degree murder if the killing was committed in the
perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, or kidnapping.
1. 574 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
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against the insurance companies (relators), alleging vexatious refusal to
2
pay on the insurance policies.
In response to interrogatories, each of the relators identified the person who made the decision on its behalf to deny the fire loss claims. The
depositions of those individuals were taken, during which each of these key
witnesses was asked what he considered before denying the claim. Each
stated that three letters written by John C. Risjord, the attorney representing the relators in the matter of the fire loss claims, were among the materials reviewed. 3 Production of all the materials reviewed by the insurance
company representatives was then requested. The relators produced these
materials, except the three letters written by Risjord to the insurance
companies. The relators asserted that the three letters were protected from
discovery proceedings as they constituted privileged communications between attorney and client.
Cannova and Mid-Continent subsequently moved for a court order
directing the witnesses to produce the three letters in question. After a
hearing, trial judge Laurence Smith issued an order directing the production of the documents. 4 In response to this order, the relators sought a
writ of prohibition. In rendering its first decision in this case, 5 the Missouri Supreme Court declined to issue a permanent writ of prohibition
and ruled that the trial judge should examine the letters in camera, using
standards set forth in the majority opinion,6 to determine whether the
letters were privileged.
Judge Smith accordingly examined the letters and, applying the standards handed down by the supreme court, held that the three letters were
not protected by the attorney-client privilege. The relators again sought
prohibition, and a provisional rule in prohibition was issued. The matter
was reconsidered, and in a stunning reversal the Missouri Supreme Court
overruled its prior decision and held that the three letters were privileged
2. Suit was brought in three counts. In Counts I and II the claimants
sought to recover the face amounts of the policies plus damages, attorney's fees, and
interest. Count III was brought against Risjord's law firm and the relators, and
alleged that statements in the letter denying the claim were libelous. As to this
latter claim, the trial court sustained a motion for summary judgment.
3. Attorney Risjord was employed by the relators to assist in investigating
the cause of the fire and to represent their interest in the lawsuit filed by Cannova and Mid-Continent.
4. The order did contain a provision that the documents could first be
submitted to the court for review by the judge, who reserved the right to exclude any portions of the documents from discovery proceedings.
5. State ex rel. Great American Ins. Co. v. Smith, 563 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. En
Banc 1978).
6. Judge Donnelly cited four instances where the attorney-client privilege
would protect a letter written by an attorney to his client from discovery: "when
the letter: (1) 'concerns any communication made to him by his client' in the
attorney-client relation; or (2) contains 'his advice thereon'; or (3) could lead to
'the use of his statements as admissions of the client'; or (4) could lead 'to inferences of the tenor of the client's communications.'" Id. at 64.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/8
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and not subject to discovery. The supreme court opinion set forth a broad
view of the privilege, asserting:
[W]hen one undertakes -to confer in confidence with an attorney
whom he employs in connection with the particular matter at
hand, it is vital that all of what the client says to the lawyer and
what the lawyer says to the client ... be treated as confidential and
protected by the attorney-client privilege. 7
As a result, the provisional rule in prohibition was made permanent.
Several basic statements can be made regarding the privilege; these
will provide a framework in which Great American can be considered.
The attorney-client privilege dates back at least to the reign of Elizabeth I,
and is "the oldest of the privileges for confidential communication." 8 As
it first developed, the privilege was the attorney's, not the client's.0 This
has since changed, and the privilege under the modern theory is the client's,
not the attorney's. 10 Restated in general terms, the privilege provides that
an attorney cannot be compelled to testify as to communications between
himself and his client which relate to the business and interest of the client
for which the attorney has been consulted. Essentially, the purpose of the
privilege is to protect the client." The basic rationale for the privilege
is to "enable a client to place unrestricted and unbounded confidence in
his attorney in matters affecting his rights and obligations without danger
of having disclosures forced from the attorney on the witness stand."'12
At first blush, the logic of the rationale for the privilege appears irrefutable. Problems arise, however, when the scope of the privilege conflicts with another basic legal principle, namely, that of placing all the
evidence having rational probative value before the trier of facts in a
lawsuit. This latter view was espoused by Wigmore in his treatise on
evidence, in which he argued for the existence of a limited attorney-client
privilege, one which should "be strictly confined within the narrowest
possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle." - 3 These two basic
formulations set the stage for the ideological clash in Great American.
One view, that adopted by the majority in Great American, urges the
7. 574 S.W.2d at 383 (emphasis in original).
8. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
9. 8 J. WIGmORE, supra note 8, § 2321, at 629.
10. Id. For an application of the modern theory, see Fischer v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 424 S.WV.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).

11. 81 Am. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 172 (1976).
12. Id. Other interesting explanations of the rationale for the attorney-client
privilege are presented in Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney.Client Privilege, 8 ViLL. L. REv. 279 (1963); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101 (1956) (arguing

that privileges are based upon a right to freedom from the state's supervisory

powers); Sedler & Simeone, The Realities of Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHno
ST. L.J.

1 (1963) (strongly supportive of a broad attorney-client privilege); Note,

The Attorney-Client Privilege:Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 H.utv. L. Rlv. 484 (1977).
13. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2291, at 554.
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preeminence of the attorney-client privilege and considers as secondary the
need to have all evidence of probative value placed before the trier of
facts. The other view, shared by the dissenters in Great American, asserts the primacy of broad discovery proceedings and the need of the
judicial system to have all relevant evidence presented to the trier of facts.
It is important to recognize that a longstanding state statute provides for an attorney-client privilege in Missouri.' 4 Section 491.060 of
the Missouri Revised Statutes reads in part: "The following persons shall
be incompetent to testify: ... (3) An attorney, concerning any communication made to him by his client in that relation, or his advice thereon,
without the consent of such client."'15 In Great American, however, the
supreme court pointed out that the statute does not limit or diminish the
common law rule.' 6 The critical issue to be considered, then, is the scope
of the common law prior to the Great American decision. Although the
majority opinion in Great American specifically states that the "opinion
does not broaden the scope of the attorney-client privilege as it has existed
and been applied in Missouri,"' 7 this is a disputable assertion. It would
appear that the decision considerably expands the attorney-client privilege
beyond both the statutory requirements and prior case law.
It is significant that the trial judge acted fairly and properly in determining whether the three letters in question were privileged. A wellestablished principle in Missouri provides that "[w]hether a communication is a privileged one is a question for the court."' s Thus, absent an
14. The privilege was recognized in Missouri as early as 1889. See RSMo §
8925 (1889).
15. RSMo § 491.060 (1978).
16. 574 S.W.2d at 382. Accord, Bussen v. Del Commune, 239 Mo. App. 859,
871, 199 S.W.2d 13, 20 (St. L. 1947), where the court stated that the Missouri
statute "is declaratory of the common law rule."
17. 574 S.W.2d at 385 n.6.
18. Hull v. Lyon, 27 Mo. 570, 576 (1858). Accord, State v. Brauch, 529 S.W.2d
926, 930 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); Hutchinson v. Steinke, 353 S.W.2d 137, 144
(St. L. Mo. App. 1962). The rule that the issue of privilege is a question of law for
the trial court to determine is nearly universally accepted. See San Diego Professional Ass'n v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 194, 202, 373 P.2d 448, 453, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 384, 389 (1962), where the California Supreme Court accepted the ruling
of the trial judge denying a claim of attorney-dient privilege with respect to an
engineering report. The court stated:
Whether the facts of an individual case support a conclusion that an
expert's report did or did not emanate from the client as a confidential
communication to his attorney, is a question for the trial court in the first
instance. Nothing in the discovery statutes or in the law of privilege authorizes a reviewing court to disturb such a finding if there is any substantial evidence to support it.
Id. at 202, 373 P.2d at 453, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 389. See also Lietz v. Primock, 84
Ariz. 273, 278, 327 P.2d 288, 291 (1958) ("trial court in the first instance must
determine whether or not the privilege surrounds the answers called for by the
questions propounded"); Ex parte Lipscomb, 111 Tex. 409, 415, 239 S.W. 1101,
1103 (1922). The rule has been accepted by the federal courts as well. See
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 864 (8th Cir. 1956); Attorney Gen. v.
Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (D.D.C. 1977).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/8

4

1980]

Tomaszcuk: Tomaszczuk:
New Attorney-Client
Privilege in Missouri:
CASES
RECENT

abuse of discretion, an appellate court will accept the finding of a trial
judge as to the existence of a privilege. In Great American, no such abuse
of discretion was alleged. Judge Smith's initial order allowed the defense
attorneys to submit the three letters to the court for his review, thereby
protecting the documents from plaintiffs' attorneys until a determination
was made as to the existence of the privilege.' 9 Upon receiving the first
ruling from the supreme court, Judge Smith conducted the in camera
hearing as ordered, but still believed that the letters did not fall within
the scope of the privilege as established by the standards handed down by
the supreme court only a few weeks earlier.2 0 Moreover, there is no suggestion in the second Great American opinion that Judge Smith misapplied
the law as set forth in the earlier Great American decision when he determined that the letters were not privileged. Despite the court's disclaimer, 21 one can conclude only that the court made a distinct determination to broaden the scope of the attorney-client privilege beyond its previous application in Missouri, so as to achieve the desired result: protecting
the three letters in question from discovery.
The attorney-client privilege has long been recognized by the Missouri courts, but the exact limits of the privilege have not heretofore been
established. 22 The Great American case is particularly significant because
it specifically addresses the issue of which communications between attorney and client are privileged. Prior to this decision, the Missouri courts
had not firmly resolved the question of whether the privilege extends to
all relevant communications between attorney and client, or only to those
which disclose a fact or statement made by the client to the attorney.
As early as 1886, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized the attorneyclient privilege and the policy arguments raised in its support. In State v.
Dawson,2 3 the court reversed burglary and larceny convictions after finding
19. This situation is to be compared with that facing the Texas Supreme
Court in State ex rel. West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1978), where the court
held improper the ruling of a trial judge which ordered that allegedly privileged
material be produced at a deposition, and which preserved objections based on
the attorney-client privilege until the time of trial. The Texas court stated that
"an attorney should not be required to produce documents that he considers to
be within the attorney-client privilege until after a trial court has determined
whether or not they are privileged." Id. at 246.
20. See note 6 supra.
21. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
22. There are three plausible explanations for this dearth of case law. The
first is that-appellate courts have deferred to the decisions of trial courts on the
issue of privilege, because of the longstanding Missouri rule that privilege is a
matter of law to be determined by the trial court. See note 18 supra. The second
is that discovery regarding communications from attorney to client is not sought
in many lawsuits because such communications often are not relevant to the central issues of the lawsuit. Finally, even if communications from attorney to client
are deemed not privileged but are deemed relevant, such communications are
inadmissible on hearsay grounds if the attorney's out-of-court statements are offered for their truth.
23. 90 Mo. 149, 1 S.W. 827 (1886).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
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that the trial court erred in permitting the defendants' attorney to
testify as to the kind of money defendants paid him as a retainer. 24 In
Dawson, the court described the privilege as one which protected "the
client from a disclosure by his attorney, not only of what he has communicated to his attorney orally or in writing, but of any information derived
by the attorney from being employed as such." 25 Seventeen years later, in
State v. Faulkner,26 the supreme court added the requirement of confidentiality to the Dawson language and denied a claim of privilege on the
ground that "[t]he rule does not exclude all that passes between client
and attorney, but that only which passes between them in professional
confidence." 27 In both of these early cases the language describing the
scope of the privilege is actually quite broad, but because neither of the
fact situations involved the specific issue presented in Great American, i.e.,
whether a communication originating wholly with the attorney is protected, this language may be doubtful authority for the court's resolution
of that specific issue.
In 1927 the Missouri Supreme Court had occasion to consider the
scope of the attorney-client privilege in a claim of privilege similar to
that made in Great American. In State ex rel. Chicago, R.I. & P. Railway v.
Woods, 28 the court allowed a claim of privilege for letters written by the
attorneys to the client in regard to a previous lawsuit. The court asserted
that "[t]o be privileged such communications, whether made by the client
to the attorney or by the attorney to the client, must be made during the
existence of the relationship and must have been made because of such
relationship." 20 It can be argued that the Woods decision is ample precedent for the holding in Great American, and it is certainly true that the
two decisions are not inconsistent. In Woods, however, the court never
stated whether the letters in question revealed prior confidential communications from client to attorney, or whether the letters were selfinitiated communications by the attorney. Thus, the precedential effect of
the Woods decision as to the scope of the attorney-client privilege is uncertain.
In Ex parte Schneider,30 a decision rendered the same year as the
Woods decision, the St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of Appeals
held that an address given to an attorney by his client was privileged information. The court stated that "[i]t is undoubtedly the general rule that
all confidential communications between attorney and client, made because
of the existence of such relationship, and concerning the subject-matter of
24. The defendants were charged with stealing, among other things, $160
in silver coins. Mr. French, defendants' attorney, testified that defendants paid
him $45 in silver and $5 in gold as a retainer.
25. 90 Mo. at 155, 1 S.W. at 829.
26. 175 Mo. 546, 75 S.W. 116 (1903).
27. Id. at 597, 75 S.W. at 132.
28. 316 Mo. 1032, 292 S.W. 1033 (En Banc 1927).
29. Id. at 1040, 292 S.W. at 1036.
30. 294 S.W. 736 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/8
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the attorney's employment, are privileged." 31 Because the communication
in question was from client to attorney, and thereby protected by the state
statute, the court's broad language is dictum and questionable authority
for the proposition that an attorney's self-initiated communication is protected.
In 1953, twenty-six years after Woods and Schneider, the Missouri Su32
preme Court in State ex rel. Terminal Railroad Association v. Flynn,
made permanent a provisional rule in prohibition to protect from discovery
four photographs of an accident scene taken by relator's employee. The
court's reasoning in Flynn refers to both the work product privilege and
the attorney-client privilege, but a close reading of the opinion indicates
that the holding is based predominantly on the operation of the work
product privilege. Thus, the Flynn decision did little to clear up the uncertainty regarding the true scope of the attorney-client privilege in Missouri.
A little more than a decade later, in the 1964 case of Heald v. Erganian,33 the Missouri Supreme Court again had the opportunity to consider the attorney-client privilege. The court held that statements by the
defendant to his attorney regarding a real estate transaction were privileged
and had been improperly admitted into evidence. The supreme court excluded the communications in its review de novo of the evidence in the
transcript, but as the communications in question were from client to attorney, and thereby privileged under the state statute, the court once again
had no occasion to expand the privilege.
Perhaps the broadest statement of the privilege was made by the Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals in Erickson v. Civic
Plaza National Bank.34 There the court in dictum asserted that "[w]hen
the client has committed his affairs to an attorney for his advice thereon,
communications between them made in confidence . . . are privileged
against disclosure." 35 In Erickson the appellate court did not elaborate
further on this assertion, presumably because plaintiff's counsel did not
adequately attack defendant's claim of privilege.
This was the state of the law at the time the Missouri Supreme Court,
in the first Great American opinion, ordered Judge Smith to conduct the
in camera hearing to determine whether or not the letters were privileged.
The first Great American opinion provided standards to guide Judge
Smith in his determination, standards which were essentially a reformulation of the Missouri statute and of the Wigmore test of the privilege.3 6 In
the second Great American opinion, the supreme court, after first taking
note of the fact that the Wigmore approach does not protect all of the
31. Id. at 738.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69 (En Banc 1953).
377 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1964).
422 S.W.2d 373 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
Id. at 378.
See note 6 supra.
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possible communications between attorney and client, specifically rejected that view as too narrow. The court concluded that the Wigmore
approach "does not provide enough protection for the confidentiality
of attorney-client communications to accomplish the objective for which
the privilege was created and now exists." 7 The supreme court endeavored
to extend the Wigmore test by providing for a privilege for virtually all
communications between attorney and client related to the subject matter
of the consultation.38
The majority opinion in Great American cites the case of Bussen v.
Del Commune 39 with approval, asserting that the key issue in determining
the existence of the privilege is whether the relationship of attorney and
client existed at the time of the communication with reference to the
subject matter of the communication. 40 The Bussen court, however, adopted the view that "the communication, if it is to be privileged, must have
been made to the attorney in his professional capacity, and on account of
the relation of attorney and client." 41 As Judge Seiler notes in his dissent
in Great American, the communication at issue in Bussen was from the
alleged client to the attorney. Seiler goes on to assert:
[Bussen] is not authority for the proposition that if the attorneyclient relationship exists, any communication by the attorney to
the client is privileged, [but] is authority only for the proposition
that if the relationship does exist, then a communication by the
client to the lawyer is privileged,
but that is not what we have
42
before us at the moment.
This distinction between Bussen and Great American seems persuasive,
and thus the majority's reliance on Bussen as authority for its view of
the scope of the attorney-client privilege may be suspect.
Prior to Great American, with the exception of the Woods decision43
and notwithstanding the broad dictum set forth in Erickson,4 4 the test
for the existence of the attorney-client privilege was applied narrowly.
That is, for the privilege to exist, the communication must have originated
45
with the client and have been directed to the attorney. In Dawson,
Schneider,40 and Heald,4 7 the attorney-client privilege was invoked precisely because the communication in question originated with the client
37. 574 S.W.2d at 384.
38. Id. at 383.

39. 199 S.W.2d 13 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947) (rejecting.Del Commune's asser-

tion of the privilege on the ground that the note in question, written by the alleged client, had not been communicated on account of the attorney-client rela-

tionship).
40. 574 S.W.2d at 386-87.
41. 199 S.W.2d at 20 (emphasis added).
42. 574 S.W.2d at 388.
43. See notes 28 & 29 and accompanying
44. See notes 34 & 35 and accompanying
45. See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying
46. See notes 30 & 31 and accompanying
47. See note 33 and accompanying text
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/8
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and was directed to the attorney. Bussen is authority for the proposition
that an attorney's communication to a client is privileged only to the extent that it reveals the nature of the client's communication to the attorney. In essence, the supreme court has determined that the privilege in
Missouri will now be applied broadly, protecting both communications
from client to attorney and from attorney to client. Under this broad
view of the privilege, the legal analyses and opinions of an attorney not
based upon information given by the client to the attorney will be included within the scope of the privilege.
By way of comparison, the federal courts, to a considerable extent,
have applied a narrow test for the existence of the attorney-client privilege
and have regularly cited with approval the test formulated by Judge
Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.4 8 The pertinent
portion of this test provides:
[The attorney-client privilege applies only if the] communication
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services
or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort.4 9
Wyzanski's test provides no protection for an attorney's communication to
a client not related to a fact disclosed to the attorney by his client. As between a broad attorney-client privilege and extensive discovery proceedings, the trend in the federal courts has been to consistently favor extensive
discovery proceedings. 50
The one chink in the armor of the broadened Missouri privilege is
that the supreme court continues to recognize that discoverable factual
information cannot be made privileged "by being recited by the attorney
or the client in their confidential communications." 5' 1 By way of example,
the court goes on to point out that written reports of investigative agencies
cannot be attached to privileged letters so as to prevent discovery.
48. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950) (sustaining in part defendant's objection
to the introduction of nearly 800 exhibits on the ground of attorney-client privilege).
49. Id. at 358. The Wyzanski test is cited with approval in Bird v. Penn Cent.
Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Penn. 1973), where the court utilized a narrow test of
the privilege and denied the claim of privilege ("to the extent the information
sought to be discovered was not conveyed to counsel by his client, the attorneyclient privilege is inapplicable"). Also citing the Wyzanski test are Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962) (refusing to apply the privilege with regard to
an attorney's testimony concerning the income tax liability of his clients), and
J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
50. See cases cited note 49 supra. For a recent federal case in Missouri supporting extensive discovery proceedings as against a broadening of the attorneyclient privilege, see American Standard Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 80 F.R.D. 706, 709
(W.D. Mo. 1978), where Judge Becker held that "[b]y voluntarily injecting into
a litigated case, a material issue which requires ultimate disclosure by the attorney
of the information, ordinarily protected by the privilege, the client makes the information discoverable."
51. 574 S.W.2d at 385.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
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In his dissent, Judge Seiler finds little solace in this limitation placed
upon the broadened privilege. In his view, "[t]he broadened scope of attorney-client privilege established by the proposed opinion will dismantle
a good part of the scope of Missouri discovery." 52 Seiler's concern in this
area appears well-founded, and it can be presumed that astute attorneys,
seeking to provide their clients with the best possible representation in an
adversary setting, will push the privilege to the limit and attempt to protect damaging evidence from discovery by including it within the attorneyclient relationship. This appears to be the danger inherent in the court's
holding. Expansion of the privilege is intended to protect clients, but if, as
a result of Great American, discovery becomes more difficult, clients stand
to gain little. If expansion of the attorney-client privilege hinders the discovery of evidence vital to a litigant's case, that litigant may be forced
to go to great additional expense or hardship to overcome the effects of
the privilege. One can easily imagine a factual communication written
by the attorney to the client which is essential to the case of the opposing
party but which cannot be discovered by that party because the communication is now privileged.
Speculating for just a moment, and remembering that the cause of
action in Great American was vexatious refusal to pay, suppose the three
letters in question in the noted case contained Risjord's repeated recommendation to his client to deny the fire loss claims on the ground that the
attorney representing the claimants was incompetent and that a successful
lawsuit was highly unlikely. Suppose the three letters contained a report
of Risjord's own investigation into the cause of the fire, and he concluded that the cause was accidental and that the claims should be paid.
Finally, suppose the three letters contained Risjord's recommendation to
deny the claims on the ground that the claimants were affiliated with the
Mafia and had a history of "torching" unproductive businesses. The information in each of these hypothetical communications would have considerable bearing on the disposition of the case, and could even be determinative of the outcome. Given that the central issue in the case is
whether there was a vexatious refusal to pay the insurance claims, the
claimants have a pressing need to discover the nature of the communications in each of the hypotheticals. 53 Great American prevents such discovery by virtue of the expanded attorney-client privilege.
The Missouri work product rule will be of little assistance in such
instances because that rule does not apply to privileged communications. 54
52. Id. at 388.
53. See Weinshenk v. Sullivan, 100 S.W.2d 66 (St. L. Mo. App. 1937), where
the appellate court refused to allow defendant's claim of attorney-client privilege
because disclosure of privileged communications was necessary to protect the rights
of the plaintiff/attorney in his suit for services rendered.
54. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56.01 (b) (1), the rule providing general limitations on

the scope of discovery, provides that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/8
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As Judge Seiler points out in his dissent, "Under the proposed decision
work product can now easily be made privileged and hence immune from
discovery." 55 Unfortunately, the majority opinion in Great American specifically avoids a discussion of the relationship between the rules regarding discovery of work product materials and the broadened scope of the
privilege. 56 As it now stands, the scope of the broadened privilege would
57
appear to restrict significantly the operation of the work product rule.
The balance to be struck between the competing values at stake remains subject to litigation, but Great American is a clear victory for those
who believe an expansive attorney-client privilege is desirable.5 s Whether
that belief is correct will be determined to a large extent by the attitude and
conduct of the bar in response to the Great American decision. If the expanded scope of the privilege is used to promote genuine communication
between attorney and client, then the interests of justice will be greatly
furthered. If the new privilege becomes a vehicle to conceal information
vital to the trial of a lawsuit, however, both attorneys and clients, as well as
society as a whole, will ultimately be the worse for it.
ALEXANDER
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55. 574 S.W.2d at 388.
56. Id at 385 n.7.
57. The Missouri work product rule, Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56.01 (b) (3), was
adopted on January 1, 1975. Prior to that time, there was virtually an absolute

prohibition on the discovery of work product materials in Missouri. State ex rel.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69 (En Banc 1953),
should be reconsidered in light of this. It is somewhat surprising that the daimants' attorney did not invoke the discovery provisions of the work product rule
with respect to the three letters in question in Great American. One major difference between the two protective de-vices is that the work product privilege is the
attorney's, while the attorney-client privilege is the client's.
58. See State ex reL Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. En Banc 1976),
where the Missouri Supreme Court held that statements given by the insured to
his insurance adjuster fell within the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
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